Homeless Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight and Out of Mind by Kanter, Arlene S.
Masthead Logo
NYLS Journal of Human Rights
Volume 3
Issue 2 Vol III Part Two Spring 1986 - Homelessness Article 4
1986
Homeless Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of
Sight and Out of Mind
Arlene S. Kanter
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human
Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Kanter, Arlene S. (1986) "Homeless Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight and Out of Mind," NYLS Journal of Human Rights:
Vol. 3 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol3/iss2/4
HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL PEOPLE: NO LONGER
OUT OF SIGHT AND OUT OF MIND
ARLENE S. KANTER*
INTRODUCTION
People have been living on the streets of our cities since the
nation began. Yet more people in the United States are home-
less now than at any time since the Great Depression.1 The esti-
mated number of homeless people vary widely, ranging any-
where from a low of 250,0002 to as many as three million,3 and
growing4 despite recent alleged improvement in the economy.'
Further, no longer are they predominantly middle-aged single
men suffering from alcoholism.' Today's homeless are a hetero-
geneous group-younger and including many more women, chil-
* Staff attorney, Mental Health Law Project, 2021 L Street, N.W., Suite 800, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20036. LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1983; J.D., New York
University, 1981; B.A., Trinity College, 1976. The opinions expressed are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent official MHLP Policy.
1. K. HOPPER AND J. HAMaERG, THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S HOMELESS: FROM SKID Row
TO NEW POOR, 1945-1984, at 9 (1984).
2. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URE. DEV., A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS
AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS 18-19 (1984). HUD's estimate of 250,000-350,000 homeless is
widely considered conservative and has been criticized as based on inadequate study re-
sulting in a distortion of the numbers of homeless people as well as the nature of home-
lessness. HUD Report on Homelessness: Joint Hearing on S. 98-91 Before the Sub-
comm. on Housing and Community Dev. and the Subcomm. on Manpower & Housing of
the House Comm. on Govt. Operations, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 25 (1984).
3. M. HOMBS AND M. SYNDER, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A FORCED MARCH TO No-
WHERE vi (1982), (available from the Community for Creative Nonviolence, Washington,
D.C. 20009).
4. REPORT OF THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELESSNESS: A COMPLEX
PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 10 (1985) [hereinafter "GAO REPORT"].
5. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE HOME-
LESS CRISIS, H.R. REP. No. 47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985) [hereinafter "HOUSE REPORT
ON HOMELESS CRISIS"]; U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE GROWTH OF HUNGER, HOME-
LESSNESS AND POVERTY IN AMERICA'S CITIES IN 1985: A 25 CITY SURVEY 24-26 (1986) [here-
inafter "1986 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS REPORT"]; U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, STA-
TUS REPORT: EMERGENCY FOOD, SHELTER AND ENERGY PROGRAMS IN 20 CITIES 1-2 (1984).
6. See Strauss, Alcohol and the Homeless Man, 7 Q. J. STUDY OF ALCOHOL 260 (1946);
Meyerson and Meyer, Origins, Treatment and Testing of Skidrow Alcoholic Men, 275 N.
ENG. J. MED. 419 (1966).
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dren and families.7 Moreover, they are no longer confined to ur-
ban areas. Smaller cities,8 rural areas9 and even affluent
suburbs,10 perhaps for the first time in their history, are forced
to confront the problem of homelessness.
The causes of homelessness have also expanded. Recent
studies typically cite several factors contributing to the explosive
increase in the number of homeless people: insufficient low-cost
housing," unemployment,12 cuts in federal income-assistance,
nutrition and job programs,' 3 personal crises" and recently
added to the list of causes, deinstitutionalization-the policy
that led to the release of many patients from mental hospitals.'
5
This article will discuss the extent to which deinstitutional-
ization may have contributed to the increased homeless popula-
tion. Following a review of the events leading up to deinstitu-
tionalization, such as the landmark lawsuits that secured for
patients the right to be free from unnecessary hospitalization,
the article will explore obstacles to the establishment of compre-
hensive services, including housing, for people who are mentally
ill and homeless. The article will then review current litigation
efforts that seek to establish the right to services in the commu-
nity for people in need of mental health care. Finally, it will ex-
7. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 13; 1986 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS REPORT, supra
note 5, at 15-16.
8. M. CuoMo, 1933/1983-NEVER AGAIN-A REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS Asso-
CIATION TASK FORCE (1983) [hereinafter "NGA REPORT"].
9. Homelessness in America: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Com-
munity Development, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1984).
10. E.g., a recent study indicated that in Nassau County, N.Y., an affluent New York
City suburb, there are thousands of homeless men, women and children. ENZER, REPORT
TO THE NASSAU ACTION COALITION (1983).
11. E.g., E. BAXTER AND K. HOPPER, PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES: HOMELESS ADULTS
ON THE STREETS OF NEW YORK CITY 31-32 (1981); NGA REPORT, supra note 8, at 36-40;
GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-27; 1986 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS REPORT, supra
note 5, at 19-20.
12. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS REPORT, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: TEN
CASE STUDIES 11-21 (1984).
13. Id. at 6-7, 26, 30, 36; GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 23-24; HOUSE REPORT ON
HOMELESS CRISIS, supra note 5, at 15.
14. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23; NGA REPORT, supra note 8, at 41-44.
15. 1986 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS REPORT, supra note 5, at 17. See also THE
HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIA-
TION 15 (H.R. Lamb, ed. 1984); Bassuk, Rubin, and Lauriat, Is Homelessness A Mental
Health Problem?. 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1546 (1984).
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amine possible solutions to these problems.
I. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
Deinstitutionalization is a philosophy, a process and a fact."6
As a philosophy, it reflects a liberal humanitarian ideology com-
mitted to community-based care for people suffering from
mental illness. As a process, it refers to the release of patients
from state mental hospitals and the corresponding development
of services in the community. As a fact, it is considered synony-
mous with the dramatic reduction in the daily census of state
hospitals.
1 7
As many as 30 percent of the current homeless population
may be mentally disabled-many of them the victims of the in-
completely executed deinstitutionalization policy of the past 20
years." Certainly homelessness and psychiatric illness interact.
Unresolved psychiatric problems may result in homelessness.
Conversely, homelessness may provoke or exacerbate symptoms
of mental illness. Yet despite this growing body of literature on
the prevalence of psychiatric illness among the homeless, most
of it is anecdotal, based on personal impressions, not scientific
inquiry. Nevertheless, some critics now see an easy solution to
the problems of mentally ill people who are homeless: declare
deinstitutionalization an outdated failure and return homeless
people who are mentally ill or considered troublesome to mental
hospitals. Yet, returning people to mental hospitals is not a solu-
tion for reasons discussed below.
Before beginning to assess the relationship, if any, between
homelessness and deinstitutionalization, however, it is essential
to understand the confluence of factors that contributed to
adoption of deinstitutionalization as a national policy.
16. Bachrach, A Conceptual Approach to Deinstitutionalization, 29 HosP. AND COM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 573-78 (1978).
17. Goldman, Adams and Taube, Deinstitutionalization: The Data Demythologized,
34 HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129 (1983).
18. According to a 1986 report, an average of 33% of homeless people are mentally
ill, ranging from 6% in Yonkers, N.Y., to 60% in Denver, Colo. 1986 U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
19861
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A. Historical Trends in Institutional Care
Historically, mentally ill people have been subjected to deri-
sion, unequal treatment under the law, segregation and even
abuse.19 Since the days of Colonial America, mentally ill people
and people falsely labeled as mentally ill have been convenient
scapegoats for public prejudices and fears.20 Their condition had
been variously ascribed to moral defect, disease, dereliction or
evil spirits and they have been treated as undesirables, criminals
or both. 1
In the early 19th Century, for example, those once called
social deviants were instead labeled "insane" and confined in
jails and almshouses.2 2 The squalid and unsanitary conditions of
these facilities led reformers such as Dorothea Dix (1802-1887)
to regard mentally ill people not as delinquents, but as the un-
fortunate victims of society. She went from state to state investi-
gating the conditions of the "insane" in poor houses, jails and
other institutions. As a result of her work and the work of
others, public attention was drawn to the plight of people with
mental illness. Dix is credited with the creation of some 30 asy-
lums, and, by the time of the Civil War, 28 of the nation's 33
states had established mental hospitals.
As interest in the nature and causes of behavior grew among
the public, it grew among the medical community as well. "Con-
cepts of illness replaced concepts of social deviance: medical
treatment became the new rationale for institutionalization.
'23
Accordingly, "moral treatment" became popularized based on
the "belief that man could be perfected by manipulating his so-
cial and physical environment.
'2 4
19. See E. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 3-6 (1984); see generally A. DEUTSCH,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLO-
NIAL TIMES (2d ed. 1949).
20. Id.
21. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL
ABILITIES 18 (Sept. 1983).
22. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 19 at 129.
23. Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services, 238 Sc.
AM. 46-47 (1978). See also P. BROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE 27-29 (1985): D. ROTHMAN,
CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE
AMERICA 293-317 (1980).
24. Morrisey & Goldman, Cycles of Reform in the Care of the Chronically Mentally
Ill, 35 HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 785-86 (1984).
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These therapeutic objectives were defeated, however, by in-
adequate public funding and an increasing demand for segrega-
tion of deviants to "protect society." Institutional care seemed
too expensive in terms of the results achieved, and state legisla-
tors began to cut funding for institutions.2 Just like the alms-
houses before them, asylums became large, custodial warehouses
-depositories for the mentally ill and others whom society pre-
ferred to keep out of sight and out of mind.2
The inhumane conditions in these institutions were eventu-
ally documented and made known to the public by journalists
such as Albert Deutsch 7 and Erving Goffman.2 s Sociological
studies of the 1950s and 1960s also revealed that state-run insti-
tutions, rather than offering a therapeutic environment, were de-
humanizing warehouses of abused and neglected people.2 9 While
such expos6s heightened public awareness, they produced no
real reform. In 1958, the president of the American Psychologi-
cal Association referred to mental hospitals as "bankrupt be-
yond remedy."30 However, the exposure did lead, in 1946, to the
enactment of the National Mental Health Act, which established
the National Institute of Mental Health to study the causes of
mental illness and to develop methods for prevention.31 The
Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health was also formed
in those years, and in 1961 the Commission recommended im-
proving conditions in state hospitals and developing community
alternatives to state hospitals.3 2
25. D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 132 (1971).
26. See P. BROWN, supra note 23 at 28.
27. A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948) and A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY
ILL IN AMERICA (1948).
28. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961).
29. Id. at 12-74.
30. Statement of Harry Solomon, quoted in Robitscher, Implementing the Rights of
the Mentally Disabled: Judicial, Legislative and Psychiatric Action, MEDICAL, MORAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH 145, 146 (F. Ayd ed. 1975).
31. National Mental Health Act, ch. 538, § 2, 60 Stat. 421 (1946); 42 U.S.C. §§ 201,
209, 210, 215, 218, 232, 241, 242(a), 246 (1983).
32. The U.S. Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health was a quasi-govern-
mental, interdisciplinary body, formed by the American Psychological Association and
the American Medical Association's Council on Mental Health. Its mandate was to assess
the nation's mental health needs and develop methods of meeting those needs. Its rcom-





At the same time as public attention was drawn to the
deplorable conditions of mental hospitals, World War II stimu-
lated new thinking about alternatives to institutional care. Many
draftees were rejected for psychiatric reasons and many more re-
turned home in need of psychiatric treatment.33 During the
1950s, the use of psychotropic medication began to stabilize the
symptoms of many mentally ill people, and initially the newly
discovered drugs were thought to cure schizophrenia. 4 As a re-
sult, veterans hospitals, followed by state hospitals, began re-
leasing great numbers of patients. These patients were sent out
into an unprepared and suspicious community with a medication
regimen to help them cope, but not much more. Little planning
for their discharge was done, and little support was provided to
help them find a place to live, or to learn to adjust to the pres-
sures of day-to-day life "outside", or to find jobs or rehabilita-
tion training. The outcome was predictable (if unforseen): many
released patients simply fell through the "cracks" to land on the
street. As a result, a disproportionate number of veterans
swelled the population on cities' skid rows in the 1950s and
1960s.35
33. Talbott, Twentieth Century Developments in American Psychiatry, 54 PSYCHI-
ATRic Q. 207 (1982).
34. Since the introduction of psychotropic medication, researchers have now estab-
lished that although these drugs may be quite effective in controlling certain symptoms
of schizophrenia (such as delusional thinking and certain hallucinations), they are totally
ineffective in controlling other symptoms (such as withdrawal and apathy). It has also
been discovered that these medications have serious side effects which may, if untreated,
cause permanent damage or death. See Brown and Kocsis, Sudden Death and Antipsy-
chotic Drugs, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 486 (1984). See generally
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOOY, FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (J. BARCHAS, P. BERGER, R.
CIARANELLO, G. ELLIOT eds. 1977).
35. To a great extent this policy has continued. Between 1963 and 1981, the Veterans
Administation reduced the number of its psychiatric beds nationwide from 59,000 to
28,500; a decrease of over 50%. Partly as a result of this policy, homeless men have
continued to include a high proportion of veterans over the years. In San Francisco, for
example, it is estimated that 30% of homelesss men are veterans. See Hope and Young,
From Backward to Back Alleys: Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless, 17 URB. &
Soc. CHANGE REV. 7 (1983).
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C. Funding Incentives
Federal funding incentives also accelerated deinstitutional-
ization. Until 1963, fiscal responsibility for psychiatric patients
rested solely with the state. In 1963, as a result of humanitarian
and fiscal concerns, Congress responded to President Kennedy's
proposal of the Joint Commission Report by enacting the
Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act.3 6 For the first time, the federal gov-
ernment assumed part of the financial responsibility for provid-
ing mental health care to people outside of hospitals by provid-
ing grants for the initial costs of staffing newly constructed
community mental health centers (CMHCs). Under the Act,
CMHCs were eligible to receive federal funding if they offered
certain services, including inpatient care, outpatient care, emer-
gency services, partial hospitalization, consultation and educa-
tion. The Act envisioned a nationwide network of CMHCs pro-
viding comprehensive services and individual case management
for areas of 75,000-200,000 people. It also urged coordination be-
tween federal, state and local health planning agencies, welfare
departments and urban renewal agencies.3 7 Yet of the 2,500
CMHCs anticipated in the Act, fewer than 700 have been built,
serving less than half of the nation. 8
D. Litigation
The final factor which contributed to the policy of releasing
large numbers of patients from mental hospitals was litigation.
Inspired by the successes of the civil rights movement on behalf
of black people in the 1960s, lawyers filed several inpatient law-
suits to protect and expand the rights of mentally disabled peo-
ple. These civil libertarian concerns for the rights and treatment
of patients in mental hospitals and retardation facilities
prompted a series of landmark decisions based on novel consti-
tutional theories. These cases established the rights of mentally
ill and developmentally disabled people to treatment and pro-
36. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1983), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35 Section
902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 560 (1981).
37. See P. BROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE, supra note 23 at 41-42.




tection from harm, 9 to procedural and substantive protections
in the civil commitment process,' e to protections against intru-
sive and hazardous procedures (such as sterilization or forced
medication'), and to appropriate community services."2
The first case to recognize a constitutional right to treat-
ment of mentally disabled patients involuntarily confined in
state institutions was Wyatt v. Stickney.3 In a 1971 ruling, a
district court in Alabama held, that "involuntarily committed
patients unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive
such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic
opportunity to be cured or improve his or her mental condi-
tion."" The court went on to state that "to deprive any citizen
of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confine-
ment is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide
adequate treatment violates the fundamentals of due process.' 45
Accordingly, a year later, a detailed consent decree was adopted
requiring compliance with specific standards on floor space, toi-
let doors and other living arrangements; imposing patient-staff
ratios; requiring detailed individual treatment plans within 48
hours of admission; prohibiting excessive medication and the use
of medication as a punishment or for staff convenience or as a
substitute for programs; requiring that work done by patients be
voluntary and compensated at the minimum wage; restricting
39. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholdt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated 414 U.S. 473 (1974), modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Wis. 1974), remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), prior judg. reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(E.D. Wis. 1976).
41. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1983) (recognizing the right to refuse
medication in non-emergency situations); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.
Ala. 1973) (state statute authorizing involuntary sterilization of mentally disabled in-
mates held unconstitutional); 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.201-50.210 (prohibiting the use of federal
funds for involuntary sterilization of mentally handicaped children and adults).
42. E.g., Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
43. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) aff'd
sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. at 784.
45. Id. at 785.
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physical restraint and isolation; and guaranteeing patients their
right to privacy, mail, phone and visitors.
Just three years later, the Eastern District Court of New
York held that institutionalized mentally retarded people are
entitled to protection from harm, reasoning that they are enti-
tled to at least as much constitutional protection as convicted
criminals. The court in New York Association for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller4 observed that this liberty interest en-
compassed protection from assaults by other residents or staff,
adequate medical care, exercise and outdoor recreation and the
necessary elements of personal hygiene. As a result, a detailed
consent decree was adopted requiring habilitation for the volun-
tarily and involuntarily confined mentally retarded residents of
Willowbrook Developmental Center. Between 1976 and 1982,
2,000 of Willowbrook's 5,400 residents entered living arrange-
ments in the community that were generally safe, decent and
even habilitative.
Most recently, in Youngberg v. Romeo,4s the Supreme
Court, by an 8-1 majority, ruled that a patient in a state institu-
tion for the mentally retarded has a right to "adequate food,
shelter and clothing and medical care."'49 Youngberg also estab-
lished that a mentally retarded person involuntarily committed
to a state institution retains liberty interests secured by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in "safety and free-
dom from bodily restraint."50 Those liberty interests "require
the state to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training
to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.""1 In deter-
mining what training is "reasonable," the Court emphasized that
"courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
qualified professional.
'52
In addition to the Wyatt, Willowbrook and Youngberg
46. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752 (E.D. N.Y. 1973).
47. This experience shows, therefore, that even the most handicapped and long-term
institutional residents can be returned to the community and benefit therefrom. See D.
ROTHMAN AND S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 353-54 (1984).
48. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
49. Id. at 315.
50. Id. at 319.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 322.
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cases, which addressed conditions in institutions, the Supreme
Court decided Donaldson v. O'Connor.53 In Donaldson, the
Court was presented with the question of whether the state has
a right to continue confining a nondangerous patient when the
hospital fails to provide treatment to the patient. The Court
held that patients "who are not dangerous to themselves or
others, are receiving only custodial care and are capable of sur-
viving safely in freedom or with the help of family or friends"
could not be institutionalized against their will."' Four years
later in Addington v. Texas,"5 the Supreme Court held that the
state must prove by "clear and convincing" evidence, rather
than the lesser standard of "preponderance of the evidence,"
that a person should be confined in a mental hospital against his
will.
Other early cases involved efforts to obtain community ser-
vices as an alternative to institutionalization. These cases, such
as Brewster v. Dukakis56 and Dixon v. Weinberger,7 established
a right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative setting.
Brewster was filed in 1976 on behalf of institutionalized and
noninstitutionalized people, including residents of Northampton
State Hospital, a large state hospital located in the western part
of Massachusetts. The case was brought to compel the state to
develop a comprehensive system of community programs as re-
quired by a 1966 state law empowering the Department of
Mental Health to create community-based residential programs
instead of developing programs in the large state hospitals.
Brewster was settled in 1978. The effect of the settlement cre-
ated vastly improved community-based programs in the western
part of Massachusetts. 8
Filed in 1974 on behalf of patients at the federally operated
St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C., plaintiffs in Dixon
53. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
54. Id.
55. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
56. Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
57. Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
58. After the Brewster decree was finalized, the state legislature refused to appropri-
ate sufficient funds to carry out the decree and the court of appeals refused to compel
the legislature to do so. Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F. 2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). The Brewster
decree then became the subject of political negotiation and the result is one of the na-
tion's most successful community mental health programs.
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sought to establish, under the United States Constitution and
District of Columbia statutes, a right to treatment in less restric-
tive facilities outside of the hospital, so long as such treatment
would be consistent with the individual's treatment needs. On
December 23, 1975, the federal district court held that the city
and federal governments had a joint obligation under D.C. law
to provide suitable care and treatment outside the hospital to all
patients who did not require hospitalization. Following several
years of unsatisfactory implementation by the city and the hos-
pital, the court ordered defendants to develop a plan for the cre-
ation of a continuum of community-based facilities as the basis
of a remedial order.5 9 After lengthy negotiations, a plan was ac-
cepted and approved by the court in April, 1980. The plan and
accompanying consent order represented a major effort to ad-
dress the difficult problems involved in implementing such a ju-
dicial order, including stimulating sound planning for the neces-
sary changes, gaining the commitment of people in the
bureaucracy to the ordered changes and designing an effective
monitoring system to ensure compliance with the order.
Under the settlement, the city and federal governments
were obligated to provide plaintiffs with community mental
health care; adequate and appropriate residential services, in-
cluding group homes, foster homes and nursing homes; and com-
munity support services. In sum, the decree is a model for a
comprehensive mental health system. Nevertheless, the results
have not been realized. Even after contempt proceedings, the lo-
cal government has failed to dedicate the necessary resources
and effect the structural changes needed to implement the
decree.
In sum, deinstitutionalization stemmed from a combination
59. At the time the lawsuit was filed, St. Elizabeth's Hospital was owned by the fed-
eral government on land leased to it by the District. In November 1984, Congress passed
legislation providing that by 1991, the hospital would be the sole responsibility of the
District of Columbia government. Pub. L. No. 98-621, 98 Stat. 3369-3382 (1984). In par-
ticular, the legislation provides that between 1984 and 1987, the District is obligated to
develop a plan for a comprehensive integrated community-based mental health system
and to submit the plan to local groups for review and to Congress for its approval. The
legislation further provides that between 1986 and 1991, the federal government will con-
tribute $135 million towards the hospital, after which the District will become solely
responsible for the hospital. Finally, in an extremely unusual move, the legislation re-
quires that the District's plan be "in full compliance with the federal court consent de-
cree in Dixon v. Heckler." Id. at 3370.
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of therapeutic, economic and libertarian concerns. For many, it
has been a great success. Most mentally ill people leaving hospi-
tals have returned to their families or their own apartment.
Others have returned to halfway houses, group homes or resi-
dential treatment programs. Indeed, most never become home-
less. Yet for too many, deinstitutionalization has not yet fulfilled
its promise of appropriate services in the community and some,
both former patients and people who once might have been in-
stitutionalized, have fallen through the "crack" between hospital
and community-based mental health care and have become
homeless. Deinstitutionalization has thus brought people with
mental illness squarely into public view, where they have gener-
ated fear and hostility. Consequently, the professional literature
is increasingly cynical of the deinstitutionalization process. Yet,
rather than focus on the inadequate discharge planning which
has occurred in recent years, the next generation of reform
should learn from history's lessons and acknowledge that com-
munity care must include housing, income and food, as well as
mental health services. The next section of this article will ad-
dress ways of facilitating the development of these much-needed
services for people who are mentally ill and homeless.
II. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES To THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR MENTALLY ILL HOMELESS
PEOPLE.
A. The Lack of Housing Funds
For many homeless mentally ill people their most pressing
need is not for mental health services, but for a decent place to
live. Access to private and public housing, obviously a problem
for all who are homeless, is especially difficult for mentally ill
people. They may lack the ability to search for housing or the
knowledge of how to apply for it or the skill to negotiate a com-
plex bureaucracy. Further, people who are labeled mentally ill
often face blatant discrimination. Even if a homeless person
with a mental illness is able (perhaps with the assistance of
others) to secure housing in the open market or in a federal
housing program, it may not be appropriate for that person's
particular needs.
Although most people diagnosed as mentally ill live inde-
342 [Vol. III
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pendently in the community, 0 some require a more supervised
and supportive living situation. Such facilities do exist. Models,
including group homes, community residences and patient-run
alternatives for mentally ill people are not lacking. What is lack-
ing are the resources and political support to develop sufficient
alternatives to keep pace with the need.
Medicaid is one source of funding for the development of
housing opportunities for mentally ill people, but it is inade-
quate. In 1981, the Medicaid statute was amended by the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act to provide a new funding source
for medical and nonmedical community services as alternatives
to institutions. The Community Services Waiver Provision, §
1915 of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1396n(c), allows states to apply for a waiver of certain Medicaid
requirements in order to offer home and community-based ser-
vices. Receipt of the waiver depends on the state's showing that
the services are needed by certain individuals to avoid institu-
tional care. The state must establish that "but for the provision
of such services the individuals would require the level of care
provided in a skilled nursing facility or intermediate care facil-
ity, the cost of which would be reimbursed under the state
[Medicaid] plan."61
The community service waiver provision was hailed by
many because, for the first time, nonmedical services could be
funded through Medicaid. States would now be free to provide a
range of services for disabled people, including housing. The
60. A recent study by the National Institute of Mental Health reveals that as many
as 29.4 million, or approximately 19% of the population, suffer from some form and
degree of mental illness. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NIMH,
MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES 1985 4 (C. Taube and S. Barrett eds. 1985). NIMH also
estimates that of the 2.4 million people labeled chronically mentally ill, 1.5 million now
live in the community. Of these, 110,000 people are in short-term treatment in hospitals,
290,000 people live in halfway houses or group homes, and 1.1 million people live in
private homes by themselves or with friends or families. Morgenthau, Abandoned, NEwS-
WEEK, Jan. 6, 1986.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (1981). Under this law, the state is allowed to fund a
range of services including nursing services, medical supplies and equipment, occupa-
tional therapy, homemaker and personal care services, respite care and case manage-
ment. Educational activities and vocational training are not reimbursable under a
waiver. 50 Fed. Reg. 10020 (1985). Further, room and board generally may not be paid
for through the community service waiver unless they are deemed to be part of the over-
all cost of respite care specialized foster care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(1) (1981).
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waiver provision has not, however, realized this dream. The
Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA) has interpreted the
waiver legislation not as an approach to shifting resources from
institutions to the community, but as a cost-saving device.
HCFA now requires states to document a reduction in their
Medicaid budget by showing either an actual reduction in the
number of institutional beds or a decrease in the number of new
institutional beds planned.62 In other words, HCFA has refused
to approve Medicaid waivers to states seeking to expand Medi-
caid services or to shift to Medicaid the cost of existing
services. 8
Another federal program which appears, on paper, to pro-
vide funding for the development of community services, includ-
ing housing, is Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Unlike the
community service waiver program, which reimburses states, SSI
is a federally funded and administered program under the Social
Security Act which provides cash assistance directly to needy
blind, disabled and aged persons.6 SSI has long provided most
of the community-services money for most of the adult disabled
population."
But even SSI has not fostered the development of enough
appropriate living opportunities for people with mental illness.
While it has covered basic living expenses, for many disabled
people who are unable to support themselves, SSI is not likely to
meet, in any significant way, the needs of people who are men-
tally ill and homeless.
An SSI recipient can seldom secure permanent housing rely-
ing on an SSI check as the sole source of income. SSI pays only
a maximum of $336.00 per month to a single individual.6 Given
the shortage of low-cost housing, this barely covers rent, not to
62. 50 Fed. Reg. 10027-28 (1985).
63. Further, the community service waiver regulations limit waiver approval to three
years. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(3) (1981). Thus, every three years the state is forced to seek
approval and to demonstrate again that its program is cost-effective. For this reason,
many states are reluctant to rely too heavily on what may be considered an experimental
program.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1984).
65. SSI is not available to persons in publicly owned or operated facilities housing
more than 16 people. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(A) and (C) (1984).
66. This amount is as of January 1, 1986. SSI pays $504.00 per couple. See SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FACTS AND FIGURES AT YOUR FINGERTIPS (1985).
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mention food, clothing and other necessities. Some local agencies
have begun to overcome this problem by locating low-cost hous-
ing for two or more SSI recipients to share. Some states also
provide supplementation of SSI payments, which can increase
community living opportunities for chronically mentally dis-
abled people. However, even with increased SSI payments, other
problems remain.
Delays in determining an individual's eligibility for SSI ex-
acerbate the housing plight of many people. Eligibility for SSI is
determined by deciding first whether the individual is disabled
on medical grounds and then whether the person is capable of
returning to past work or doing other work for which he may be
qualified by age, education or work experience." A determina-
tion of medical eligibility requires the opinion of a physician.
Unless a homeless person has access to free medical services and
transportation to the appropriate offices, obtaining the necessary
medical report can be a major barrier to receiving benefits.
Yet even when someone completes the application process,
eligibility may not be established for months. In the meantime,
survival can be difficult. While some states provide interim assis-
tance, most do not. Further, since there is no presumption that a
person leaving a mental hospital is entitled to SSI, the individ-
ual may not apply until after release, and then he or she will not
receive a check for months. Between the time the individual
leaves inpatient care and months later when the first check is
received, a former patient with no resources many end up on the
street.
67. In recent years, the Social Security Administration's manner of adjudicating
claims for disability benefits has been severely criticized for, among other things, relying
on outmoded concepts of disability and ignoring certain evidence relevant to a mentally
impaired person's ability to work. Successful court actions challenging SSA's methods
and policies have been brought in New York and Minnesota. See City of New York v.
Heckler, 106 S. Ct. 57, 88 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1986) and Mental Health Association of Minne-
sota v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1982), aff'd, 720 F. 2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983).
In addition to these court challenges, Congress has amended Section 5(a) of the Social
Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 5(a), 98 Stat.
1801, requiring SSA to revise its standards for mental impairment cases. The agency has
also issued new rules which establish criteria for determining a mentally impaired per-
son's eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520a (1986). See also, Rubenstein, SSA




B. Community Opposition to Community Residences
An even more insidious obstacle than lack of funding to the de-
velopment of housing opportunities for people with mental ill-
ness is community opposition, expressed by the enactment and
application of exclusionary zoning laws and restrictive cove-
nants. These exclusionary tactics have made it difficult and
sometimes impossible to expand housing for mentally ill people
who are mentally ill and at risk of becoming homeless."'
Zoning is the primary means by which localities regulate the
use and development of land and is recognized today as a legiti-
mate exercise of the government's common law police power.6 9
Normally, local zoning laws contain few substantive provisions;
typically, they protect "the health, safety, morals and welfare of
citizens" and afford localities the power of zoning to "prohibit
activities that are harmful to the community." Many communi-
ties, relying on stereotypes and prejudices, have recently seized
upon local zoning laws as a means to exclude mentally disabled
people from their neighborhood by preventing the establishment
of community residences or group homes. Nevertheless, most re-
cent decisions by federal and state courts have rejected such at-
tempts to exclude group homes and have upheld the rights of
people leaving institutions to reside in the community.
70
Litigation challenging such local zoning laws usually in-
volves the operators of a prospective group home against the lo-
cal zoning authority. For example, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center," the Supreme Court considered whether the city of
Cleburne, Texas, had acted improperly in denying a special-use
permit to the operator of a group home for 13 mentally retarded
68. Zoning laws have also been used in attempts to prevent the opening of shelters
for homeless people. See St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken,
479 A. 2d 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983) (court held church's operation of a shelter was an
exercise of religion and could not be prohibited by the city); S.C.O.P.E., Inc. v. Zoning
Board of Vineland, No. L-053018-84 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (court reversed zoning
board's decision to deny shelter's application for use variance in light of the overwhelm-
ing need for a homeless shelter).
69. The exercise of a locality's zoning authority has long been recognized as justified
by the state's police power. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
70. Kanter, Recent Zoning Cases Uphold Establishment of Group Homes for the
Mentally Disabled, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515-18 (1984).
71. 53 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S. July 1, 1985); 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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adults. In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the right of the group
home to open, but rejected plaintiff's claim that heightened judi-
cial scurtiny was appropriate in cases brought on behalf of men-
tally retarded people.72 According to the majority, the city's os-
tensible justifications for denying the special-use permit were
either impermissible or unworthy of belief.73 The Court found
that "mere negative attitudes or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not
permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently from apartment homes, multiple dwellings and the
like.",
7 4
In addition to zoning cases, such as Cleburne, which pit
group-home operators against local zoning authorities, other re-
cent cases have involved individual private property owners op-
posed to group homes opening in their neighborhoods. The most
common vehicle used in such opposition to group homes is liti-
gation over restrictive covenants running with the land. In the
vast majority of such cases, courts have allowed the group home
to open despite a restrictive convenant limiting the use of prop-
erty only to residential purposes and single-family homes. Be-
cause the homes would be operated by nonprofit corporations
and because the residents would function much like any other
household, most courts have held that such homes fall within
the language of the restrictive covenant.75
72. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that mentally retarded persons con-
stitute a quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened judicial review under the equal pro-
tection clause because of the segregation, political powerlessness and prejudice to which
they have been subjected. 726 F.2d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1984).
73. The justifications were "impermissible" because they were based merely on
neighbors' fears and "unworthy of belief" because they were the product of alleged con-
cern for the residents' safety living in a house located on a 500 year flood plain.
74. 53 U.S.L.W. at 5026. For a detailed discussion of the Cleburne decision, see Mar-
gulies, The Newest Equal Protection, 3 N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTS. ANN. 359 (1986).
75. See Kanter, supra note 70; Crane Neck Association v. NYC/Long Island County
Services Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336 (1984), appeal dismissed, 53 U.S.L.W.
3234 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1984); Knudston v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Har-
bour v. Normal Life of Louisianna, 454 So.2d 1208 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Concord Estates
Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Special Children's Foundation, Inc., 459 So.2d 1242 (La. Ct.
App. 1984); Vienna Bend Subdivision Homeowners Assoc. v. Manning, 459 So.2d 1345
(La. Ct. App. 1984); Clark v. Manuel, 463 So.2d 1276 (La. Sup. Ct. 1985); Gregory v.
Rhode Island, 495 A.2d 997 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1985); Collins v. City of El Campo, Texas, 684
S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) See also Craig v. Bossenberg, 351 N.W.2d 591 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984) (court concluded home did not fit language of restrictive convenant, but
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A third type of case has been brought to secure the right of
a group home to open in the face of community opposition. In
People v. 11 Cornwell Company,6 the Attorney General of New
York, as parens patriae, brought suit against a group of neigh-
bors who bought a house when they heard the state had planned
to purchase the property for use as a group home for mentally
retarded adults. The State of New York sued the property own-
ers, alleging they had violated the civil rights of the prospective
residents and the New York human rights law. The Second Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's decision in favor of the state.7
Also, in Greenwich, Connecticut, a group of property owners
who were unsuccessful in preventing the opening of a group
home for mentally ill adults in their neighborhood, petitioned
the town's tax review board to lower the assessments on their
homes. The tax board agreed to lower their assessments based
on nothing more than the neighbors' fear that the group home
justified the reduction.78 On April 19, 1985, suit was filed against
the tax review board by the Attorney General, acting as parens
patriae, Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., as a Greenwich tax-
payer, an association of residential facilities and others. 9
C. Litigation to Secure Community Services
In addition to housing, some homeless people need mental
health care. Today, such care outside of mental institutions is
difficult to obtain. The need for communty-based mental health
care remains acute, and advocates have embarked on new strate-
gies to secure them.
The time and expense involved in litigating class actions
combined with the Supreme Court's current conservatism about
the judiciary's proper role, have reduced the number of omnibus
upheld right of home to open by declaring convenant void as against public policy). Cf.
Omega Corporation of Chestefield v. Malloy, 319 S.E.2d 720 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1984).
76. 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 44.
78. In fact, all studies on the subject establish, without exception, that there is no
adverse impact to the property values of homes located near a group home. See MENTAL
HEALTH LAW PROJECT, THE EFFECTS OF GROUP HOMES ON NEIGHBORING PROPERTY: AN
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Feb. 1986). 2021 L Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C.
20036.
79. Lieberman v. Board of Tax Review, No. CV 850076085 (Conn. Super. Ct. April
19, 1985). For information on this case, contact the author.
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class actions filed on behalf of mentally disabled people who
need therapeutic and support services. However, a new strategy
has been tried with success.
The most common successful strategy for reallocating
mental health dollars from mental institutions to community
care has been litigation brought under state law. Because federal
courts are reluctant to recognize a federal constitutional right to
community mental health treatment, or mental health treatment
in the least restrictive environment, litigators have sought to es-
tablish the right under state, rather than federal, law.80 For ex-
ample, in a recent Arizona case the plaintiff class, consisting of
indigent mentally ill residents of Maricopa County, sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief against defendants Department of
Health Services, Arizona State Hospital and the County Board
of Supervisors. 8' Plaintiffs asked the state court to compel de-
fendants to perform their mandatory duties under state mental
health law, which included creating a unified and cohesive sys-
tem of community mental health care. The court found for the
plaintiffs and, despite defendants' claim of inadequate funds, or-
dered them to fulfill their mandatory duties. Arnold v. Sarn is
the first case in which a state court has ordered the development
of a comprehensive system of care for chronically mentally ill
people.
8 2
The Arnold decision is particularly instructive regarding the
80. Several lower federal courts have discussed whether the state is required to pro-
vide community services to mentally disabled people. Although two courts of appeals
have held that institutionalized people have no constitutional right to placement in the
community (Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d
Cir. 1984), and Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983)), a recent Fourth
Circuit decision reached a different result. In Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th
Cir. 1986), the court held that a mentally disabled young man, who had been in and out
of foster homes and institutions throughout his life, had a right to an appropriate place-
ment in the community and supportive services. The court distinguished this case from
Society for Goodwill and Phillips on the grounds that in Thomas' case a discrete recom-
mendation for treatment in the community has been made by qualified professionals.
Although Thomas was no longer institutionalized, the court read Youngberg to permit
awarding relief to him by noting that the liberty interests in Youngberg did not arise
because of institutional confinement.
81. Arnold v. Sarn, No. C432355 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty, June 25, 1985).
82. See also Goebel v. City & County of Denver, No. 81MH270 (Probate Ct., City &
Cty. of Denver, May 7, 1985) (court held lack of sufficient funds did not excuse defend-




factors necessary to create a comprehensive community mental
health system. Using as a model the consent decree in Dixon,83
the court ordered the following services as necessary for the op-
eration of an effective system: case management, residential ser-
vices, day treatment, outreach, medication, outpatient counsel-
ing, crisis stabilization, mobile crisis services, socialization,
recreation, work adjustment and transportation. In fact, the
court specifically recognized that deinstitutionalized individuals
are often at risk of rehospitalization because the "residual im-
pairments of their illness interfere with successful adjustment to
community life unless provided with adequate community
mental health services. ' 84 Accordingly, the court further ordered
the Arizona State Hospital to ensure that discharged patients
have a place to live as well as an adequate program for necessary
treatment. 88 This decision, therefore, potentially will benefit
many homeless people who are mentally ill.
Another example of a case filed under state law which, if
successful, will result in services for mentally ill people who are
homeless is Klosterrnann v. Cuomo.86 In Klostermann, nine
plaintiffs discharged from state psychiatric facilities into shelters
or onto the streets claimed violations of their federal and state
constitutional and statutory rights to treatment and housing.
The court held first that plaintiffs enjoyed no constitutional
right to treatment because they were not currently patients of
state mental hospitals. According to the court, the constitutional
right to treatment in the least restrictive environment applies
only when an individual is under restraint or otherwise confined.
However, the court also held that if the state was providing com-
munity mental health to plaintiffs who had been discharged
from psychiatric facilities but not to other severely mentally ill
patients, such as the homeless plaintiffs, plaintiffs had presented
a cognizable cause of action for discrimination under federal and
state equal protection clauses and Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
83. See supra note 57.
84. Arnold v. Sam, supra note 81, at 8-9.
85. Id.
86. See Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 463 N.E.2d 588
(1984); Joanne S. v. Carey, 115 App. Div. 2d 4, 498 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1986) (alleged unlawful
confinement of 140 patients in Manhattan State Psychiatric Center due to the absence of
a place in the community for them to go).
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tion Act.8
Advocates cannot expect, however, that merely obtaining a
state court order or a consent decree will result in an adequately
funded high-quality mental health system any more than does a
federal court order.8 8 Indeed, some courts will consider a defend-
ant's claim of inadequate resources as a legitimate justification
for inaction. For example, in Mental Health Association v.
Deukmejian,89 the California Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's denial of relief to two named plaintiffs who sought
release from a state mental hospital, alleging a violation of a
constitutional right to treatment in the community under the
California constitution and state law. Although California's
mental health law90 created a legislative preference for treat-
ment in the least restrictive setting, the court, relying on
Youngberg v. Romeo and its progeny,91 held that it did not cre-
ate an absolute right to such treatment. Although the extensive
evidence presented documented the many deficiencies of the
hospital-based system, nevertheless, the court refused to assume
the authority to determine how the mental health system should
be structured and funded. According to this court, states have
considerable latitude in deciding how mental health services
should be provided, indeed, whether they should be provided at
all. The state must only demonstrate that its decision was
reasonable.
III. RESISTING EFFORTS To CHANGE THE STANDARD FOR CIVIL
COMMITMENT
As advocates, courts and members of the psychiatric com-
munity have agreed upon the need for alternatives to hospitali-
zation, many states have revised their civil commitment laws to
make it more difficult for people to be unnecessarily confined to
87. The court also held that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action with respect to
defendant's failure to prepare written service plans for each discharged patient.
88. See discussion of Dixon, supra, notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
89. See MHA v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531 (1986), af'g, No. JOOO-540 (Cal.
Super. Ct., L.A. Cty., April 12, 1985) (Memorandum Decision).
90. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5000-5599, especially at 5008. (West 1969).
91. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) and such cases as Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children
v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983);




inpatient care. About one-third of the states have adopted stan-
dards for civil commitment which provide that only persons who
are mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others may be
committed.92
With an apparent rise in the number of homeless people
who appear to be mentally ill, some commentators93 and psychi-
atrists94 are calling for change in these commitment laws. They
claim the effect of our current policy is to abandon to the streets
people who urgently need mental health care. To correct this sit-
uation, they argue, commitment laws should be changed to make
it easier to hospitalize someone against his will. They further
blame mental health advocates and civil liberties lawyers who
fought the early deinstitutionalization cases for permitting men-
tally ill people to "die with their rights on."95
In its comprehensive report on the homeless mentally ill, for
example, the American Psychiatric Association has hailed at-
tempts to allow homeless people to be committed more easily.9 6
Homeless people can be "helped," the APA asserts, if state laws
are changed to permit the commitment of anyone who is "likely
to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration."'"
For several reasons, however, such a change in the commit-
ment standards does not respond to the problems of mentally ill
people who are homeless. First, most homeless people do not
suffer from mental illness. A study that is often cited as support
for the claim that most homeless people are severely mentally ill
is imprecise. The study consists of brief interviews at one shelter
in one city over only five nights.' It is inappropriate to draw
92. See E. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW, 297-321 (1984).
93. C. Krauthammer, For the Homeless: Asylum, The Washington Post, Jan. 4, 1985,
op. ed.
94. E.g., Appelbaum, Civil Commitment: Is the Pendulum Changing Direction, 33
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 703 (1982).
95. Treffert, Dying With Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 1041 (1973); See Appel-
baum and Gutheil, Rotting With Their Rights-On: Constitutional Theory and Clinical
Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW
306 (1979).
96. THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIAT-
RIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 15, at 7-8.
97. See Stromberg and Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally I1, 20 HARVARD J. ON LEwis. 275 (1983).
98. Bassuk, Rubin and Lauriat, Is Homelessness a Mental Health Problem, 141 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 12 (1984). The study was conducted in Boston and Cambridge, Massachu-
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any conclusions from a study so limited in scope and geography,
and that was further skewed by being conducted at one of the
few shelters in the city to attract mentally disabled people.
Other arguably more reliable studies have reached different re-
sults, finding that most people are homeless not because of
mental illness,"9 but for economic reasons or because of the de-
pleted supply of low-income housing, unresolved family crises, or
cutbacks in benefit programs. Accordingly, if most homeless peo-
ple are homeless for reasons unrelated to their mental health
needs, the search for a solution solely within the mental health
system is misplaced.
The argument for changing commitment laws is misdirected
for a second reason. Proponents for such change argue that the
decline in the census of state mental hospitals reflects the policy
of deinstitutionalization. However, although the daily census in
state mental hospitals may have declined by more than 75%,
from 559,000, in 1955 to fewer than 138,000 in 1980,100 these hos-
pitals are far from empty. Rather, they have become short-term,
acute-care facilities. Indeed, inpatient psychiatric admissions to
both state mental hospitals and psychiatric wards of general
hospitals have increased to approximately one million a year.101
Moreover, there is little evidence that strict commitment stan-
setts during one week in April 1983. Five psychiatrists, two psychologists and two social
workers interviewed 78 homeless men, women and children. At the end of each interview,
the clinician completed a questionnaire that included standard psychiatric diagnoses
from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM III). Based on
those interviews, the study concluded that 91% of the shelter residents suffered from
mental illness.
99. See, e.g., S. CRYSTAL, AND M. GOLDSTEIN, NEW ARRIVALS: FIRT TIME SHELTER CLI-
ENTS, NEW YORK HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION (1983) (homeless people in need of
psychiatric services range from 20%-30%); OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH,
HOMELESSNESS IN OHIO: A STUDY OF PEOPLE IN NEED (1985) (30% of the people inter-
viewed had once been hospitalized and 30.8% were considered to have psychiatric
problems); 1986 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS REPORT, supra note 5, at 16 and 27 (aver-
age of 25 cities is 33% of homeless people are considered mentally ill with 6% of the
homeless in Yonkers considered mentally ill and 60% in Denver).
100. See J. MORRISSEY, DEINSTITUTIONALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL: PROCESS, OUTCOMES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVIANCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS (W. Gove ed. 1982); H. Goldman,
The Demography of Deinstitutionalization in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 34-35 (L. Bach-
rach ed. 1982), and GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 20-22.
101. Craig and Laska, Deinstitutionalization and the Survival of the State Hospital,
34 HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 616 (1983); Weinstein and Cohen, Young Chronic




dards have prevented many admissions. Other factors such as a
lack of available beds and medical decisions not to treat, have
played a larger role.10 2 Contrary to popular opinion, therefore,
there is no indication that current civil commitment laws result
in homelessness to any great extent.
A third fallacy is that existing commitment laws are inade-
quate to address the needs of severely mentally ill people who
are homeless. Approximately two-thirds of states' civil commit-
ment laws currently permit involuntary hospitalization of a per-
son who is "gravely disabled or unable to provide for his or her
basic needs."' 03 This standard is commonly defined as applicable
to a person who is unable to provide for his or her own food,
clothing, or shelter by reason of mental illness or disorder.
0 4 It
seems probable, therefore, that if a homeless person is freezing
on the streets or otherwise unable to care for himself, he or she
may be committed under current law in most states. To the ex-
tent that hospitals refuse admission to people on that basis, the
solution is not to change the law, but to educate those who ulti-
mately implement it.
The fourth reason not to change commitment laws is that
nothing will be accomplished with the change. Most people who
are homeless and mentally ill people are completely detached
from society. Outreach to them is especially difficult because
they often hide purposely trying not to be found.10 5 No one pro-
poses that these people be left on the streets to die, but remov-
ing them to a mental hospital is not a meaningful solution to
their problems. At some point, the homeless person who has
been hospitalized must be discharged. What options are then
available, other than to return to the life on the streets with lit-
tle assurance of follow-up care? Because the bulk of most states'
102. Rubenstein, APA's Model Law: Hurting the People It Seeks to Help, 36 Hosp.
AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 968, 970 (1985).
103. E. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW, 297-321 (1984).
104. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 59-1401(c) (1981 Supp.); Cal. (Well. and Inst. Code) §
5008(h)(i) (West); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 27-10-101(5); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-176, 17-
178(c); Idaho Code §§ 66-317(i), (m) and (n); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-14-9.1(b) (Burns);
North Dak. Cent. Code § 25-03.1-02; Ok. Stat. Ann. 43A § 54.3(o) (West); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 71.05.020(1).
105. See Cohen, Putnam, and Sullivan, The Mentally Ill Homeless: Isolation and
Adaptation, 35 HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 922 (1984), in which the authors dis-
cuss "Project HELP," a program established in 1982 to provide crisis medical and psy-
chiatric services to homeless people in New York City.
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mental health dollars remains allocated to hospitals, few com-
munity-care options are available to discharged patients. 10 6 Eas-
ing the civil commitment standards would only perpetuate this
unfortunate balance, and state hospitals would argue that their
increased inpatient populations require more resources. 107
It is difficult to see, therefore, how a relaxation of civil com-
mitment standards could force the federal, state or local govern-
ments to begin assuming their respective responsibilities for de-
veloping appropriate mental health and support services outside
the hospital, in the community, where most people eventually
must live.
The fact remains that, in some cities, comprehensive com-
munity-based mental health programs do succeed when essential
components, such as social support, vocational training and cri-
sis intervention are provided.10 However, in most places such
programs have not been tried, largely because states and locali-
ties have been reluctant to reallocate limited funds from the
state hospitals for the development of improved community
care. Yet, this trend is changing. In Louisiana, for example, 103
state hospital patients were moved into the community and six
wards were then closed. The result was a savings of more than
one million dollars, which was permanently transferred to sup-
port community programs.0 9 Even the prospect of closing state
hospitals altogether is now taken seriously. In Vermont, a recent
106. As of 1981, 4.2 billion dollars (70 percent of state and federal funds) were dedi-
cated to state mental hospitals, leaving the remaining $1.8 billion (30 percent) for com-
munity-based programs. U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES (1985). In fact, funds allocated to
inpatient care actually totalled more than 4.2 billion dollars considering that funds for
private and county hospitals were not included in the 70 percent figure.
107. Recent reforms in Italy's mental health system are instructive. In 1978, Italy
amended its mental health law to limit the number of psychiatric beds and restrict the
admission of patients to state hospitals. The same year a national health insurance pro-
gram was passed guaranteeing mental health coverage to all citizens. Further, commu-
nity programs were developed and job guarantees were given to all staff of mental hospi-
tals. In the first year the inpatient population decreased by 10 percent and involuntary
admissions by 60 percent. Nevertheless, there was virtually no evidence of dumping and
no significant increase in admisssions to private hospitals. L. Mosher, Italy's Revolution-
ary Mental Health Law: An Assessment, 139 AM. J. PSYCH. 199 (1982).
108. See, e.g., Beiser, Shore, Peters and Tatum, Does Community Care for the Men-
tally Ill Make a Difference? A Tale of Two Cities, 142 AM. J. PSYCH. 1047 (1985).
109. Deiner, How to Ensure that the Money Follows the Patient: A Strategy for
Funding Community Services, 37 HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 256 (1986).
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study recommended closing the state's only mental hospital and
using the savings to help pay for community programs.11 Only
when federal, state and local governments are convinced that
mental health care should be provided where people live, in the
community, rather than in remote and expensive state institu-
tions, will adequate community services be developed.
IV. CONCLUSION: WORKING TOWARD A REAL SOLUTION
Undoubtedly a connection exists between the deinstitution-
alization movement of the past twenty years and the increase in
the number of homeless people. However, the connection is
neither as prevalent nor as significant as is often thought. In-
deed, the majority of research today indicates that most home-
less people are not mentally disabled and that for those who are,
it is difficult to determine to what extent one's mental illness is
a cause or consequence of living on the streets or in shelters. At
least part of the motivation behind labeling homeless people as
mentally ill is to ease our collective consciences. If homelessness
were indeed simply a matter of personal pathology, then it
would not call into question any larger societal failure nor would
it challenge society to address the economic needs of its most
needy members.
In the final analysis, however, no easy or inexpensive solu-
tions exist for the problems confronting homeless people who
are mentally ill. Like all people who are homeless, those who are
mentally ill need, more than anything, a home. Without a per-
manent and, if appropriate, supervised or supportive place to
live, these people will continue to be homeless and thus among
the most desperate members of our society.
To change this deplorable situation, the mental health pro-
fessions must begin to address the needs of people who are
homeless and mentally ill by altering traditional approaches of
service delivery. Rethinking old methods is not an easy task.
Before mental health care for homeless people can be adequate,
service providers must develop innovative delivery systems, in-
cluding new kinds of outreach and support programs. Office
hours at a community mental health center are not the answer
110. See Rubenstein, Access to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Severely Mentally
Ill Poor People, special issue, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 382 (summer 1986).
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for homeless people who lack the organization to make and keep
appointments or even the bus fare to go across town, or whose
pride prevents them from boarding a bus where they know un-
kind stares will greet them. Rather, social workers and psychia-
trists must create the opportunity to work with homeless people
where homeless people are, on the streets, in abandoned build-
ings and in shelters.
Moreover, adequate funds must be allocated to ensure qual-
ity care for homeless people who need mental health treatment,
and it is the federal government which must provide leadership
in this area. The continuation of demonstration projects that
have proven successful is one way to help localities provide care
for homeless mentally ill people."' Second, the home and com-
munity-based care Medicaid waivers could be expanded to pro-
vide resources necessary to develop quality community mental
health systems. Finally, and perhaps most important, states
must have an incentive to reallocate their mental health dollars
from large institutions to community-based programs.
Homeless people who are mentally ill need decent shelter at
least as much as they need mental health services. A former
mental patient's successful reintegration into the community is
affected more by the quality of his immediate surroundings than
by the type of mental health services he receives."' Therefore,
any real solution to the problem of mentally ill people who are
homeless must be part of the solution needed by all homeless
people, an expansion of affordable housing.
111. For example, the Community Support Programs (CSP), established in 1977,
could be expanded to provide additional support to states and localities for developing
programs responsive to the needs of mentally ill people who are homeless. Under CSP,
the federal government makes grants to state mental health agencies to assume responsi-
bility for planning services for the chronically mentally ill. The state agency then assists
localities in developing "community support systems," defined as "a network of caring
and responsible people committed to assisting a vulnerable population to meet their
needs and develop their potentials without being unnecessarily isolated or excluded from
the community." NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DEFINITION AND GUIDING PRIN-
CIPLES FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT SYSTEMS (May 1983).
112. E. BAXTER, AND K. HOPPER, PRIVATE LIVEs/PuBLIC SPACES, supra note 11, at 31.
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